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Turkey and China: A Study in Symmetry 
 







How symmetrical are Turkey and China despite the obvious differences in size and 
resources? And how are these reflected in their relations? The interface between symmetries and 
mutual relations is investigated through (1) economy and trade and (2) international relations. 
The best arena for developing closer relations is Eurasia, specifically through the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization. The possibility of a Sino-Turkish axis of diplomacy would complement 
their wider security memberships and even bridge them. This represents a cooperative regional 
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Little has been written on relations between the Republic of Turkey and the People’s 
Republic of China, let alone their symmetrical nature. John K. C. Daly notes in a Jamestown 
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Foundation article that Turkey and China fought each other during the Korean War and concludes 
that their current battlefield is an economic one where they are competing for the same markets in 
textiles and over securing energy resources in Eurasia. On this basis, he believes their relations for 
the foreseeable future will remain “formal but distant”.
2
 One is hard pressed to find deeper or 
alternative academic analyses on the overall relationship and must resort to diplomatic speeches, 
news reports, an official website on trade relations, and the occasional paper or relevant interview 
by think tanks.
3
 In 2007 there was not even a Wikipedia entry for these two countries, as there was 
for China and Iran, for example. This is curious in view of a long intertwined history in which 
many of the people of present day Turkey and China emerged from the same Inner Asian region. 
Not only did they remain in contact for more than two millennia, principally through trade on the 
Silk Road, but were keenly aware of each other militarily on either side of the Great Wall.  
 
When it comes to profiling the two countries side by side, rather than in a relationship, the 
quest becomes more eclectic. A conference paper for the International Studies Association on 
poliheuristic theory – which seeks to explain foreign policy decision-making by observing it in 
two stages, cognitive and rational – employs Turkey and China as case studies.
4
 Why? They are 
seen as “two important states that frequently are characterized as sui generis” and show distinctive 
peculiarities. China’s peculiarity is that it cannot be analyzed purely on the basis of “Western 
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rationality, with its cost-benefit analysis” as it is grounded in a different philosophical system; 
hence “cognitive heuristics” have an important role to play in analyzing Chinese foreign policy-
making. Turkey’s peculiarity is that, as with China, its unique (sui generis) status means that it 
will “resist the predictions of models based on Western, social scientific concepts”.
5
 This also 
permits greater scope for the application of “cognitive heuristics”. What is unique about Turkey? 
The authors of the study on poliheuristic theory have noted a number of distinctive features, 
including: its democratic, secular profile in a volatile region; its capacity to absorb several military 
coups and bounce back as a constitutionally-based democracy; its religious but generally not 
ethnic ties with the Middle East; its pro-Western strategic affiliation during the Cold War; and 







Whether Turkey and China are sufficiently different from other states to warrant their 
coupling in theoretical case work remains outside the purview of this article. More relevant is the 
implicit recognition by the above study of Turkey and China forming a symmetry of difference. It 
is this idea which merits exploration as a template for reflection on relations between the two 
countries – and the potentialities they contain.  
 
Symmetries, it should be emphasized, are not only expressed in terms of broad similarities 
(in the above case, that Turkey and China are - for reasons specific to each - not confined to the 
bounds of Western rationality) but also in terms of mirror opposites. To the obvious example of 
the Cold War between the strategic competitors, US and USSR, may be added the current ‘war on 
terror’. Frank Furedi, author of Invitation to Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown, has 
described the war on terror as a “symmetry of confusion” – the “incoherent rage” of the terror 
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 4 
networks being “matched by an equally incoherent response from Western governments”.
7
 This 
departs from the usual asymmetrical rendering of terrorists as non-state actors versus Western 
governments armed with the tools of traditional security. ‘Symmetry’ and ‘asymmetry’ have 
entered the language of strategic studies to a greater degree than in the past when ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ or ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ warfare were closer to the linguistic norm, along 
with ‘guerrilla’ tactics as an element of indirect strategy. Even if the concept is old, the emphasis 
on ‘asymmetric warfare’ within the so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ became notable after 




 ‘Asymmetric warfare’ as a popular 21
st
 century military term is not only used to describe a 
situation of government forces fighting insurgencies, but also of China’s military strategy against 
the US. In its annual reports to Congress, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 
the US Department of Defense regards China as being engaged in asymmetric warfare. By the 
2007 report, the term is rendered as a subheading within chapter 3 on China’s military strategy and 
doctrine (whereas previously it was only discussed). “Identifying and exploiting asymmetries is a 
fundamental aspect of Chinese strategic and military thinking,” the 2007 report begins the section 
on asymmetric warfare, “particularly as a means for a weaker force to defeat one that is stronger.”
9
 
China’s anti-satellite test in January 2007 was widely seen as an example of Beijing’s asymmetric 
strategic thinking: that is, targeting satellite communication as a weak link in US naval warfare 
capabilities – capabilities that could be used against China in the event of a Chinese military 
takeover of its ‘renegade province’, Taiwan.  
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What lesson is to be drawn from this brief exploration of the ‘asymmetric’ being equated 
with security issues in which the weak side is, politically at least, an actual or potential opponent 
to the West (compared to Furedi’s assessment that there is in fact a symmetry – not one judged by 
power discrepancies but societal responses - between the West and its terrorist adversaries)? The 
primary one is that in a world where the ‘balance of power’ (symmetries) has largely left the 
lexicon and asymmetries have entered in the form of the strategies pursued by unconventional 
‘others’, it is instructive to see how existing symmetries of power and diplomacy – even difference 
to the normative West - might contribute to a more multipolar global arena. In this respect, Turkey 
and China are not only in a state of symmetry in identifiable areas, but through it they may find 
much in common upon which to strengthen bilateral relations. This, in turn, can be expected to 
impact on their common ground of history and future opportunities: Eurasia. In this region which 
encompasses the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia, and which represents one of the world’s 
richest, largely untapped, sources of oil and natural gas, Turkey and China have been viewed to be 
in competition over resources: 
 
The rivalry is particularly pronounced in the struggle for Caspian exports of gas and oil 
from the former Soviet states ringing the inland sea, whose reserves contain an estimated 
32 billion to 220 billion barrels of recoverable oil. Turkey scored an initial demarche in 
Azerbaijan with the May 2006 opening of the 1,092-mile-long, $3.6 billion, Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline, capable of handling one million barrels per day . . . 
 
China, however, has made significant inroads in Kazakhstan. . . . In November 2005, a 
$700 million, 600 mile-long Kazakhstan-China pipeline with an annual capacity of 20 
million barrels became operational—oil that otherwise might have flowed westwards . . . 
China has similarly trumped Turkey in Turkmenistan . . . [where China] would receive up 
to 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from the still undeveloped Yuzhny 





It should be noted that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline which sidesteps Russia to bring oil 
to Europe was supported by the US and an alternative pipeline, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium 
(CPC) from Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, was supported by 
Russia.
11
 Thus there are multi-level rivalries at play. If there is an East-West symmetry of 
competition over resources (China-Turkey, Russia-US), then the possibility arises that a symmetry 
of cooperation may be developed. This is elaborated below by reflecting on the relationship more 
broadly in time and space, cultures and philosophies. 
 
 
Eurasia: A Mandalic Region 
 
Eurasia’s historic importance in East-West trade along the Silk Road carried political 
ramifications with attempts to unify the region resulting in inter-ethnic royal bloodlines and 
pragmatism in civilization crossovers. Thus it is notable that the Tang (AD 618-906) imperial 
family came from Turko-Mongol ancestry through the Toba tribe of Central Asia. The Toba 
founded the Northern Wei dynasty in AD 386, reunifying northern China above the Yangze River, 
and extending dynastic control across the northern steppes, the Tarim Basin, and the North China 
Plain.
12
 Sino-Turkic families not only formed the ruling elites in the Tang, but deployed a 
multinational army to back China’s political power over part of the Silk Road.
13
 While highly 
Sinicized, the Tang privately maintained their language and customs. It made sense that the 
‘foreign’ rulers should adopt Chinese administrative culture, which was drawn from Confucian 
learning, in order to maintain so large an empire and retain the Mandate of Heaven (the legitimacy 
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of the time) to rule. The Sui dynasty (581-618) that came before the Tang was founded by Yang 




The first use of ‘Turk’ as a political name, and henceforth as a designation (Turkic) for a 
linguistic group, was Tujue in the sixth century. The Tujue (or Göktürk) lived in the northern part 
of presentday Xinjiang in Northwest China and expanded their empire across Eurasia as far as 
Eastern Europe and North Asia. The area, often referred to as Turkistan, was conquered by the 
Mongols under Genghis Khan in 1220. By 1279, the Mongols conquered China as well, ruling for 
89 years as the Yuan dynasty. Today, after the expansion of Tsarist Russia and, subsequently, the 
Soviet Union, Turkic culture has survived in its local variations. Five Central Asian states - 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - are identifiably Turkic in 
culture, though the region as a whole is regarded as culturally diverse. Turkic culture is also found 
in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. This eastern part of ‘Turkistan’ (hence the name 
‘East Turkistan’ or ‘Chinese Turkistan’) was conquered by China’s Manchu rulers, who formed 
the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), and was given the name Xinjiang – meaning ‘new frontier’ - when 
incorporated into the Chinese polity.  
 
From the above, it is evident that despite almost 10,000 kilometres dividing Turkey and China 
across Eurasia, Turkey is no stranger historically or culturally to its vast Eastern neighbourhood. 
China, in turn, need look no further than its own borders to find Turkic culture and to remember 
through dynastic records the Western Regions or Xiyu from whence Buddhism came but also trade 
and warfare.
15
 To employ a Buddhist metaphor in understanding the region, Eurasia may be 
viewed as a mandalic region – one that displays the properties of a mandala
16
 of mutually 
constitutive relationships in spatial proximity.
17
 The Eurasian mandala may be seen as framed by 
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the emerging powers of the current century: China and Turkey (with the city of Istanbul literally 
straddling a European and an Asian side) to the East and West; and to the North and South by 
Russia and India. At the gravitational centre of the mandala is Central Asia. It is also depicted by 
Brookings Institution author, Johannes F. Linn, as a centre of gravity in the unfolding 21
st
 century 
global economy:   
 
. . . Central Asia lies at the core of the Eurasian super-continent, the most dynamic part of 
today's global economy. Surrounded by rapidly growing China, India and Russia, Central Asia 
is a potential transit hub for the rapidly expanding transcontinental Eurasian trade and capital 
flows. Moreover it is the repository of large energy and mineral resources and home to a large 
and well educated population – 60 million people in the five former Soviet republics of Central 
Asia, or 123 million, if one adds Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Mongolia and Xinjian Uyghur 





If Central Asia is the heart of the mandalic region geographically and temporally, what lies 
at its normative centre? Will it revert to Great Game competition, as occurred in the 19
th
 century 
when Britain and Russia contested control of the region, but this time in terms of Russia and China 
as the key protagonists, with Iran, India, Pakistan, the US and Turkey as additional players? 
Alternatively, concerted effort to overcome endemic security threats could pave the way for a 
cooperative energy policy – as control of energy stands out as the prime lever of competition. 
More than that, it would advance the cause of a multipolar regionalism; one that seeks to combine 
differences within this traditional crossroads of cultures and their empires. Multipolarity, it will be 
recalled, is better attuned to the articulation of symmetries than an asymmetrical unipolarity. How 
symmetrical are Turkey and China despite the obvious differences in size and resources? And how 
are these reflected in their relations? 
 
 
                                                 
18
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Turkey and China: An Interface between Symmetries and Mutual Relations 
 
1. Economy and Trade 
 
Turkey established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 4 August 1971. This was the year 
that the People’s Republic was given the China seat at the United Nations, replacing the Republic 
of China (ROC) on Taiwan. In effect, it was a watershed year in which ‘Red China’, as it was 
commonly called, came out of the diplomatic cold. By the end of that decade, it had also emerged 
from economic isolation by joining the liberal international economic order. Since the introduction 
of market reforms in 1978, China sustained an average annual growth rate of 9.7%,
19
 and 
quadrupled the size of its economy so that it grew to be the world’s fourth largest, after the United 
States, Japan and Germany. By the end of 2006, this Communist Party-ruled state of 1.3 billion 
people held the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves of more than US$1 trillion.
20
 Besides 
benefiting from becoming the capitalist world’s ‘factory’, China has engaged in the rule-based 
global trade structure through membership in 2001 of the World Trade Organization (WTO).   
 
Turkey, too, experienced significant transformation of its economy into a more liberal and 
open system. In the 1980s, the “Anatolian tigers” emerged in a “private-sector-driven economic 
development”.
21
 After the full liberalization of capital accounts in 1989 and the liberalization 
process during the 1990s decade, the Turkish economy opened up to international financial 
markets. Rapid technological development and a concomitant increase in the speed of 
communications also advanced liberalization. During the past half decade the Turkish economy 
has grown at 6-7% per annum, which has been hailed as the “highest sustained rate of growth in 
the OECD”.
22
 Turkey is ranked as the world’s 19th largest economy and the sixth fasted growing, 
                                                 
19
  “China – Country Overview”, World Bank, 2007, available at 
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:318958~pagePK:141132~piPK:141121~theSitePK:318950,00.html, accessed 20.12.07. 
20
 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Strategic Survey 2007, Routledge, Abingdon, 2007, pp. 286-7. 
21
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22
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with PriceWaterhouseCoopers forecasting in 2006 that if the Turkish economy continues its 




How have these successes issuing from economic liberalization affected the two countries? 
After WTO membership, China’s trade volume increased with almost all countries. Low cost 
production in China provided an enormous competitive advantage. The textile industry is a notable 
example of an increase in China’s share of the market worldwide. In the US it is expected to 
account for two-thirds of the market in the next two years. Turkey with its enormous textile 
industry of about US$13.5 billion is one of the textile exporters to the EU. However, competition 
with Chinese producers has forced Turkish manufacturers to either close down their factories or 
move them to China. Strategies - such as adding high brand value to their products or generating 
labeled brands - have been developed to compete with Chinese products.  
 
Trade between Turkey and China is increasing at a rapid rate with a sixfold increase in the 
last half decade.
24
 Viewed from the perspective of the decade 1996-2006, the increase was greater 
at 1,567% or 15-fold. Total imports and exports reached US$10.4 billion in 2006, according to the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Trade figures in 2007. Compared to the trading volume between 
Turkey and its largest trade partner, the EU, the difference in the growth rate is considerable. If 
growth rates continue as projected, with an average of 50% growth for China and 20% for EU, 
Turkey’s trade volume with China will rise to half of its trade volume with the EU in 2010.  
 
 In 2006, Turkey imported US$9.7 billion worth of goods from China but its exports were 
less than a billion dollars. This meant that with China’s low cost export advantage the trade deficit 
was as high as US$8.9 billion in 2006 and accounted for 14% of Turkey’s total trade deficit. This 
represents a major asymmetry in Sino-Turkish relations. It derives not from discrepancies in 
economic size (Australia, for instance, does not have a trade deficit with China thanks to its keenly 
sought energy resources) but from the fact that two-thirds of Turkey’s imports that include 
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machinery, fossil fuels, and electronics derive from China.
25
 Turkey’s exports are too narrowly 
concentrated in a few sectors – chromium, iron and steel, marble and granite – which account for 
over half its China-bound exports.
26
 Diversification and greater market familiarity with China will 
help, and to this end establishment of the Turkish Trade Office in Shanghai is an asset. It is also 
notable that 2000 Turkish business people attended the  2007 China Import and Export Fair (the 
‘Canton Fair’), which is the world’s third largest event of its kind.
27
 Turkish business people will 
be encouraged by China being ranked as a top 10 performer in the World Bank’s 2006 ranking on 
the Ease of Doing Business. Moreover, in September 2006, China decided to revamp its tax 




It may be concluded that while there are symmetries in Turkish and Chinese economic 
growth trajectories, the trade deficit is a major asymmetry relating to Sino-Turkish trade. Both 
countries declare that there will be efforts to reduce it. Although the adjustment of the value of 
currencies may solve this problem in the longer term, the most effective and practical solution for 
today seems to be foreign direct investment (FDI). Some Turkish and Chinese pioneers have 
already invested in each other’s country. Turkish pioneers in the Chinese market include a number 
of large companies. Çimtaş NingBo, a subsidiary of ENKA Holding, is one of the biggest 
contractors in Turkey. It is manufacturing steel piping systems in Ningbo, near Shanghai. 
Demirdokum, a heating equipment provider owned by Koc Holding, is the largest Turkish 
conglomerate, and Koc Holding’s Arcelik, the leading durable goods manufacturer in Turkey 
acquired a Chinese washing machine manufacturing firm, Changzhou Casa Shinco Appliances 
Co.
29
 Arcelik also indicated that it was seeking acquisitions in China. Another example of a 
potential investment involves Colins, the Turkish cloth retailing company, which in 2007 was 
                                                 
25
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negotiating with a Chinese company for investment opportunities in the Chinese market.
30
 Other 
than these large-scale investments, trading and consulting companies have entered China for the 
conduct of import and export transactions and the provision of market entry strategies for new 
Turkish investors. Examples of business pioneers from China in the Turkish market include: 
Chery automobiles; ZTE Corporation (telecommunications company), the Yuncheng Company 
(machinery producer); Orient-Li International (the largest bearing producer in China); textiles 
manufacturer Hangshou Fuxing Group (which envisages exporting half its products and selling the 
other half to the domestic market in Turkey); Ningbo Haitian Group Co. Ltd. (plastic injection 





Tourism is another opportunity in Sino-Turkish economic relations. Regular flights to 
China by Turkish Airlines were established in 1999. Turkish Airlines tries to retain and increase its 
share of Chinese customers by serving Chinese food, showing Chinese films and providing ‘Miles 
& Miles’ programs. These have helped develop the traffic between Turkey and China. According 
to Turkish Statistics Institute data, the tourist arrivals from China indicate a 94% increase from 
2000 to 2005. The departures on the other hand indicate an increase of 102% for the same period. 
Both arrivals and departures increased at an approximate 20% rate. The tourist arrivals between 
2000 and 2005 for European OECD countries increased by 102% while the arrivals from US 
declined by 15%. The departing tourist numbers also indicate similar results: a decline of 12% for 
the US and an increase of 105% for European OECD countries. Tourism – and other consumer 
attractions for both countries’ growing middle class - will no doubt play a significant role in 
enhancing trade relations between Turkey and China in the future. As the chairwoman of the 
Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD), Arzuhan Doğan Yalçındağ, 
remarked in Beijing where she opened a branch of TÜSİAD: “The consumption habits of the 
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2. International Relations 
 
Turning to the international relations sphere, Turkey has long displayed its Western strategic 
orientation through membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). More 
recently, its civil-economic role was highlighted through acceptance as a candidate for European 
Union (EU) membership at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. Accession negotiations were opened in 
2005. The prospect of membership deepened structural reforms in the economy and the 
democratization process.
33
 Just as UN and WTO membership gave China the legitimating 
international credentials is so assiduously pursued, so too acceptance into the EU would represent 
“the crowning achievement of Turkey’s long and painful modernisation efforts”.
34
 These efforts 
began in the late 19
th
 century when “Istanbul launched one of the earliest modernization projects in 
history” and when the Ottoman military adopted Western equipment and professional education.
35
 
A more radical Westernization took root with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey under 




China, too, looked to the West in an effort to modernize without losing what it regarded as its 
cultural “essence” – though whether it was possible to adopt Western form without altering 
Chinese content was, and still is, open to debate. Modernization efforts became apparent from the 
Self-Strengthening movement of late imperial times to Sun Yatsen’s post-imperial republican 
efforts. Then came Mao Zedong’s adoption of a European ideology – Marxism – as the path to 
modernization and the attempted obliteration of a ‘feudal’ Confucian past that was deemed to have 
weakened China. Finally, Deng Xiaoping’s reform policy allowed China to switch to market 
economics and an open door policy to the West. This was not depicted as a capitulation to the 
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Western economic system or a betrayal of socialism: it was officially rendered as “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics”. China has often Sinicized its borrowings from the West. Communism 
acquired Chinese characteristics when Mao declared the peasants and not the proletariat to be the 
vanguards of the Chinese Communist Revolution. As to the more contemporary Revolution in 
Military Affairs, this too has been modified with Chinese characteristics (or “features”).
36
 So while 
China modernizes, it does so on its own terms. 
 





 centuries when their economic and political systems could not successfully respond to the 
industrializing West. The Republic of Turkey was founded as a nation-state after World War I, 
when the Ottoman Empire collapsed losing 4.5 million square kilometers of territory. Imperial 
China also lost territory through the infamous ‘unequal treaties’. During the 19
th
 century foreign 
powers began to have an increasingly severe political, military, and economic impact on both 
Turkey and China. In China’s case, potentially, the economic stimulus from this contact could 
have been positive, but in fact China during the 19
th
 century underwent profound crises, 
culminating in the Opium War with Britain in 1839 and the Treaty of Nanking (1842), which 




(a) Outsiders in a Western System 
 
Herein may be found the first key symmetry between Turkey and China whose historical 
predecessors suffered dismemberment in the case of the Ottoman Empire and humiliation with 
regard to Imperial China. They are outsiders who sought strength and progress from West’s 
                                                 
36
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scientific and social knowledge, but who are still in the process of being admitted into a West-
centric architecture of values and institutions. This is despite both having adopted Western 
institutional modalities, as noted above, from their birth as republics: China in 1912 through the 
vision of Sun Yatsen and Turkey in 1923 through Mustafa Kemal (or Atatürk). The ‘problem’ for 
China has been its trajectory into a ‘People’s Republic’ under the Chinese Communist Party. For 
Turkey it is not so much that a Muslim country seeks to join a ‘Christian Club’, a populist but 
ultimately unsustainable argument, but that the perceived flouting of Western values is at stake. 
This was evidenced in the EU’s 2006 Progress Report which cited institutional problems, breaches 




Indeed, human rights violations are common refrains against Turkey and China. The Armenian 
‘massacre’ debate has been sustained for decades, with Turkey denying that Ottoman Turks 
committed genocide against Armenians during the First World War. Rather, Turkey maintains that 
massacres occurred on both sides. To Ankara’s dismay, in October 2007, a US congressional 
committee approved a bill that recognized the mass killing as genocide. China also has its 
historical record disputed across a number of issues, from the ‘invasion’ and hence current 
‘occupation’ of Tibet, to the glorification of Mao Zedong, whose portrait still hangs in Tiananmen 
Square, but who is widely vilified abroad as comparable to Stalin or Hitler. Turkey’s treatment of 
its Kurdish population and China’s of its students in the ‘Beijing Massacre’ of 1989, remain part 
of the Western media narrative of these two countries. This has had political repercussions: an 
arms embargo by Germany in 1994 on Turkey in case the Turkish military used such arms against 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – a recognized terrorist organization; an EU arms embargo 
on China since 1989 – lest these weapons are used against Americans in the event of a Chinese 
invasion of Taiwan and the US coming to its defence. China is widely seen as obstinate in 
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insisting that Taiwan ‘reunifies’, even though it is a de facto independent country that has not 
sought to join the PRC in the manner of Hong Kong and Macao in the late 20
th
 century. Despite 
this, most states recognize the ‘one China’ policy that Taiwan is a part of China. That preserves 
diplomatic and trade relations with the world’s most populous nation and global economic player. 
As for Turkey, it had been subject to strong international criticism, including UN resolutions, for 
maintaining an ‘occupation force’ in Northern Cyprus since 1974.
39
  Still, Turkey’s strategic 
importance to the US has kept it close to the American bosom, and this despite Ankara refusing to 
allow US bases in Turkey to be used in 2003 for a northern front in the invasion of Iraq. 
 
(b) Strong States 
 
This is related to another significant Sino-Turkish symmetry: the strong state. In a world 
where the sovereign state and its territorial integrity represents a reactionary discourse; where 
transparency has become the ethos – indeed, a dogma
40
 – of the times and ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ its empirical reality, the ‘strong state’ syndrome is perhaps feared as much as the 
‘failed state’. The former, though, would surely be seen to serve its citizens and the global 
community far more effectively than the latter. One need only contemplate the alarming scenarios 
of Turkey and China as ‘failed states’ to appreciate their resolve in cultivating strength. In what 
ways are they ‘strong states’? Besides their state-centric traditions, both are economically and 
militarily rising powers with politically responsive armed forces. Indeed, from a Western liberal 
perspective, both are open to the criticism that they are in fact ‘securitized’ states; their militaries 
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are ‘politicized’; and national security is not open for public debate. (This reinforces the outsider 
status to which they are still largely consigned.)  
 
It should be remembered, however, that the leaderships of strong states are often beset with 
economic and societal development issues that act to justify their position. Both Turkey and China 
are still developing countries, despite urban pockets of 21
st
 century sophistication. The extremities 
between Istanbul or Izmir on the Aegean coast and the Anatolian heartland are matched by the 
differences between Shanghai on the Eastern seaboard and backward Shaanxi province further 
inland. But the two republics are no ordinary developing countries. As noted above, they are 
experiencing high growth rates and are increasing their strategic profile: Turkey in its potential to 
become not only an EU member but “an energy hub for the entire Eastern Mediterranean”;
41
 China 
has already become a significant player in East Asia and is on track to become the 21
st
 century’s 
first superpower. In this tension between backwardness and achievement, constraints and 




It is not surprising then that their militaries continue to play a role in politics. China’s People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), as its name implies, is a political army. It began on 1 August 1927 with 
the formation of the first unit of what was to become the Chinese Red Army, later renamed the 
PLA. It developed from a guerilla army of peasants into an infantry-dependent force in which 
guerilla tactics served a supplementary role. Functioning as the military arm of the Chinese 
Communist revolutionaries, it was formed to bring the Communist Party of China to power: hence 
Mao Zedong's oft-cited dictum that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”. He was 
quick to add that the party must control the gun. To this day the PLA - comprising Army, Air 
Force, Navy and a Strategic Missile Force - remains under the Communist Party’s direction. As 
stated in China’s 2006 White Paper on National Defence:  
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The state exercises unified leadership over national defense activities. China's armed forces are 
under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Central Military 
Commission (CMC) of the CPC and that of the People's Republic of China (PRC) are 





 In Turkey, a civilian-military bureaucratic elite presides over a strong state which is 
softening its image as it prepares to join the EU. However, despite being governed by a moderate 
Islamic party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - AKP), Turkish 
political culture in the form of illiberal secularism has been blamed for the country’s perceived 
intransigence. Reporting directly to the prime minister rather than the defence minister, the 
Turkish military has been criticised by the EU for not coming under civilian control and lacking in 
transparency.
44
 The Turkish Armed Forces justify their position by regarding themselves as the 
guardians of the secular state established by Atatürk. Such a mission has led to three traditional 
coups during the life of the republic – in 1960, 1971 and 1980 – one ‘postmodern’ coup in 1997 
(so named because the “army made clear its displeasure, and events followed without the need for 
much brute force”
45
), and an ‘e-coup’, as it was dubbed, in April 2007. This was against a 
perceived Islamist agenda by the AKP.  The official military website warned that “if necessary, the 
Turkish Armed Forces will not hestitate to make their position and stance abundantly clear as the 




To understand the importance of the guardian roles that the Turkish and Chinese armies 
play, it is well to remember that both countries regard religious extremism, separatism and 
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terrorism as priority security issues. On this basis Turkey’s military has engaged in cross border 
raids against PKK members based in Northern Iraq. Ankara not only seeks to curtail attacks on its 
population but prevent loss of territory to separatists who seek the creation of a Kurdish state. 
China is also determined to prevent separatists from ‘splitting’ the ‘motherland’. Beijing has 
threatened military action against Taiwan if the island declares formal independence; and it 
maintains tight security against Tibetan and Uyghur independence movements. 
 
Besides their political utility, the armed forces of Turkey and China are objectively 
impressive in relation to other militaries in the world, not only numerically but in terms of their 
modernization. This means that these two ‘outsider’ strong states are backed by powerful armed 
forces that can be expected to act as effective deterrents to hostile acts by lesser or greater actors – 
from separatists to the prevailing superpower. With 514,850 active personnel (another 378,700 are 
in reserve), the Turkish Armed Forces represent the second largest standing armed forces in 
NATO after the US, and eighth largest in the world. They are modern and well equipped with 445 
combat aircraft (including F-16C & D Fighting Falcons), 12 tactical submarines, 26 frigates, 
4,205 main battle tanks, as well as amphibious landing craft and helicopter gunships.
47
 China has 
the world’s largest armed force of 2.25 million active personnel (with some 800,000 reserves). It is 
nuclear armed with a full range of basing modes. It possesses some 46 intercontinental-range 
ballistic missiles, 35 intermediate-range and 725 short-range ballistic missiles. China has 2,643 
combat aircraft that include newer aircraft that are built under license from Russia, such as 116 of 
the multi-role Su-27SK (J-11) Flanker fighters. It is also deploying a fourth generation fighter, 
China’s most advanced, the J-10. The Navy has 76 principal surface combatants, 58 submarines, 
including one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, with 12 Jl-1 ballistic missiles. The 
ground force is equipped with over 7,580 main battle tanks, and – like the other services – is 
updating its equipment.
48
 The 2007 Pentagon report on China’s military power, which was cited 
above with regard to its concerns over China’s asymmetric warfare capabilities, stated that the 
PLA was “pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars 
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of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity 




For all their clear potential as rising actors with a keen sense of self-preservation against 
domestic threats, the two have not traveled far into each other’s orbit. (This was also literally the 
case: the Varyag aircraft carrier which China purchased from Ukraine was at first not even 
allowed into Turkish waters when being brought to China in 2000.)
50
 On the whole, Sino-Turkish 
military relations have been confined to the educational exchanges end of the spectrum rather than 
that of joint military exercises.
51
 Yet in view of their convergence of security interests, there is 
scope for enhanced military relations. During his visit to China in June 2007, Land Forces 
Commander Ilker Basbug said: “Turkey and China have big similarities in their perspectives on 
world affairs as well as similarities in threats and risks they face.”
52
 What did Ilker Basbug mean? 
This question was posed by Ankara’s International Strategic Research Organization to Atilla 
Sandikli - Turkish author, former TASAM general manager and retired senior colonel - in 
Sepetmeber 2007. His answer focused on a number of foreign policy commonalities. One was the 
need for a peaceful international environment in order to pursue economic development. Another 
was agreement that a united stand against terrorism was necessary. A third was critical of the US: 
he said that a multipolar world was preferable to a unipolar one in which “the only superpower 




Another question posed was: “We have many military level mutual visits with China, 
however, no serious reflection of these visits are seen. We only have an agreement about the 
rocket production in 1996. Later, we developed their range in 1999. How do you evaluate the 
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military aspect of relations between Turkey and China?” Atilla Sandikli affirmed that 
“expectations and willingness” were high and so was a desire “to increase mutual training 
activities and use of weapon systems”. However the reality was that military relations were sub-
optimal: 
 
One of the reasons for this is that Turkey’s current system is inclined to develop relations 
with the West both in terms of military and economy. In other words, we don’t have an 
infrastructure to develop relations with the Far East and China. We have neither the 
ideological infrastructure nor the sociocultural infrastructure. In fact, China also lacks the 
necessary experience for this. . . . When the necessary systems [of understanding] are 




 The inability to communicate better may be blamed partly on a certain yin-yang symmetry 
in perceived threat. Each contains a little of the other in its domestic fears: Maoists among the 
Kurds of Turkey and Turkic Uyghurs among the secessionists of China’s Northwest. Turkey, after 
all, had outlawed the formerly Maoist PKK, and China distrusts the Turkic Uyghurs who have 
long regarded Turkey as their ethnic homeland. How serious are these domestic ‘others’ as a 
threat? 
 
Yin-yang Symmetry in Perceived Threat 
 
For China, its far northwest is blessed with energy resources but disturbed by secessionist 
sentiments. Xinjiang  - the aforementioned ‘new frontier’ acquired by the Qing dynasty - is a vast 
region accounting for one-sixth of the country’s territory. Rich in oil and gas reserves, it was once 
treated as a “strategic substitutive zone” compared to China’s eastern oil fields; but with 
government incentives to develop the west (the Great Western Development program was 
launched in 1999), it is becoming the main contributor of China’s energy:  
 




According to the preliminary plans of CNPC and Sinopec, the region's oil and natural gas 
output will hit 30 million tons and 18 billion cubic meters, respectively, by 2010. Combined 
with the 20 million tons of crude oil imported from Kazakhstan via pipelines, Xinjiang will 




Xinjiang is also no substitutive zone where ethnic tensions are concerned. China’s indigenous 
Uyghur Turkic Muslims live in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region where the Han 
population has gown larger then the indigenous one,
56
 and where separatists have used violence 
toward their goal of East Turkistan independence. Some even aim for an Islamic regional 
community.
57
  While Tibet might have more international media exposure, especially through the 
public diplomacy of the Dalai Lama, it is Xinjiang which presents the greater danger in terms of 
ethnic volatility. This is not only a factor of the global ‘war on terror’, with Afghanistan a primary 
battlefield, but also a perculiarity of the Central Asian ethno-religious landscape. Xinjiang has the 
fourth largest concentration of Turkic peoples (Uyghurs, Kazaks and Kyrgyz) at about eight 
million; Uzbekistan is third largest with 23 million (primarily Uzbeks); Iran is second with 35 





As for the Kurdish symmetry to the Uyghurs, the socialist Maoist origins of the PKK are not 
the relevant concern today. Less tangible issues prevail, and then they are more in the nature of 
potential than reality. China’s recognition of the Republic of Cyprus rather than the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus is hardly exceptional, and would not compare with the fraught 
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situation of recognition or otherwise of the Republic of China on Taiwan.
59
 So this is an 
improbable issue of dispute. The interview with Atilla Sandikli sheds further light on sensitivities 
that could spur frosty relations:   
  
It is natural that each country looks at foreign policy issues according to its own interests. 
There are Uyghur Turks there [in China], they are our brothers with common cultural and 
historical backgrounds. Coming from its historical and cultural depth, it is a mission for 
Turkey to give voice to problems of Uyghur Turks and although this disturbs China, it is 
not possible to completely eliminate this. So, are we not going to improve our relations on 
the basis of this problem? [Such stagnation] is out of question. We need to develop our 
relations with China. China also follows some similar policy elements. It develops 
relations with Turkey’s neighbors, with countries like Iraq. Of course, it also has some 
relations with the Iraqi Kurds’ region. Also, in the Southern Cyprus governance region it 
has relations. The important thing here [for PRC foreign policy] is not to exceed legitimate 
levels and not to move together [with other parties] directly against Turkey. Such 
relationships would certainly disturb us. It would be very disturbing for us to see a country 
like China, which is growing in global stature, to directly contact these regions and to see 
that there are sometimes some comments which seem unfavorable to Turkey. . . . I think 
Turkey, too, has become more experienced about handling the Uyghur issue. China, as 
well, will have significant experience in understanding issues that disturb Turkey. It is to 





 What is to be done? If economic relations can be improved by diversifying trade sectors 
and investing into each other’s markets, it could well be that bilateral military relations and 
perceived insensitivity to domestic ‘threats’ are also best dealt with by expanding the horizon. This 
relates back to Eurasia as a mandalic region, one of mutually constitutive relationships.  
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 Arilla Sandikli, “The Foreign Policy Principles of Turkey and China Match Well”. 
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Beyond the Great Wall 
 
When looking at the Eurasian expanse with its Central Asian centre and emerging power 
periphery, one feature stands out. Snaking across its normative heartland, like the curve separating 
- and connecting - yin and yang, is the Great Wall. This iconic fortification was built across 
centuries of Chinese history to protect the northern borders against raids by Mongol, Turkic and 
other tribes of Central Asia. Its continued construction only ceased when China under a Manchu 
dynasty, the Qing, expanded its territory beyond the Great Wall into Mongolia. In other words, it 
took foreign influence for China to outgrow its Great Wall mentality, and then by means of 
absorbing the lands beyond the Wall into China. Maintaining such a vast domain required a 
Confucian-trained bureaucracy and a concomitant strategic culture which preferred diplomatic 
over military solutions to state insecurity.
61
 Ultimately, therefore, China needed to ‘trust in virtue, 
not walls’
62
 to succeed. While it might be argued that the People’s Republic has embarked on an 
expansionist drive into Central Asia to assure itself of energy security, it could equally (and more 
plausibly) be said that the solution to China’s energy and security problems (such as ethnic 
separatism) may be found through diplomatic cooperation. This is where region-building 
mechanisms come into play, particularly the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
 
Indeed, Beijing’s attempt to limit the danger of separatist behavior among its Uyghur 
population has been credited with being the inspiration for the SCO. “This was the key reason,” 
Fuller and Starr argue, “for China’s establishment in 1996 of the Shanghai group as a forum where 
regional security issues could be discussed . . .”
63
 Border issues, however, provided the impetus for 
the organization’s activation. The SCO was originally formed in 1996 as the ‘Shanghai Five’ - 
comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan - to demilitarize the old Sino-
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Soviet border and resolve border demarcation disputes. The ‘Shanghai Five’ became the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization in July 2001 with the addition of Uzbekistan. In 1999 ‘Islamic 
fundamentalism’ was seen as the most pressing danger for Central Asian governments; fighting 
‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’ came to dominate the agenda. This certainly links to 
China’s Uyghur problem but the SCO has evolved to specialize in “multifaceted political, 
economic and cultural cooperation”.
64
 For example, cross-border drugs crime is also targeted by 
SCO and a development fund is being considered. This takes it beyond a straightforward counter-
terrorism function and brings it into multilateral regionalism of the type that could represent a 
distinctive Eurasian international order – but “under the auspices of the UN”, as SCO Secretary-
General Bolat Nurgaliev insists.
65
 The UN’s role was emphasized at the 2007 SCO Bishkek 




The geopolitical contours of this emergent regionalism and its security architecture may 
suggest that while the Uyghur problem could have been uppermost in Chinese minds with regard 
to establishing the SCO, as well as the new states of Central Asia fearing the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism, there is also another motive attributed as the raison d’etre of the SCO: strategic 
denial of US power into energy-rich Eurasia and the possibility of close proximity to the Russian 
and Chinese borders.
67
 Even emphasizing SCO’s adherence to the UN and its Charter may be 
interpreted as a criticism of US foreign policy when it disregards the UN, as occurred with the US-
led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the SCO’s support for a multipolar world resides an implied 
criticism of US unipolar dominance of the international order. While in declaratory statements the 
SCO is not a military-political bloc and is not aimed at third parties, its joint military exercises 
may cause concern to those who fear it is intended as an anti-Western strategic alliance, with 
implicit strategic opposition to NATO. On the other hand, SCO Secretary-General Bolat Nurgaliev 
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draws attention to the fact that that the “SCO and NATO have shared concerns in fighting 




With progress in Afghanistan stalling and even sliding backwards in terms of resistance 
from the Taliban, decline in economic growth and high levels of opium production, accounting for 
93% of the world’s production,
69
 a united approach by NATO and SCO is even more compelling. 
Importantly, SCO regards itself as an open organization and as the Bishkek Declaration states, it 
“is open for interaction with all interested partners based on international law and generally 
accepted norms of international relations”.
70
 In this light, an SCO-NATO mechanism deserves 
serious attention.   
 
Fighting under NATO command would pose a problem for a number of SCO members, 
including China, a situation that could be circumvented if they were under United Nations 
command instead. But for this to occur, greater UN-NATO cooperation would be needed.
71
 On a 
lesser scale of expectations, an SCO-derived boost in the UN police presence in Afghanistan 
would help in that Afghanistan represents a greater vital interest to SCO countries than, say, the 
Middle East. Compared to the approximately 1000 Chinese peacekeepers serving in United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), China has only one police officer on a UN 
Peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. Given that Afghanistan and China (at Xinjiang) share a 
common border of 75 kilometers, a greater presence would be expected. Moreover, Afghanistan 
and its border with Pakistan represent the spiritual heartland of Islamic fundamentalism and is 
therefore of concern to all SCO members.  In a sense, SCO’s gradual enlargement through 
‘observer’ status and partnership links (including Afghanistan – see below) also prove 
advantageous. They represent a geostrategic and diplomatic encirclement of the Afghan problem, 
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while laying the foundations for cooperation on a broader scale. In the next section, SCO’s modes 
of expansion are considered, and thence the significance of Sino-Turkish relations. 
 
SCO’s Modes of Expansion 
 
India, Pakistan and Iran joined as SCO observers in 2005, and Mongolia in 2004. This has 
expanded SCO’s regional range to South Asia and the Middle East. Observer status is not confined 
to interested states but may also extend to intergovernmental international organizations.
72
 In the 
integration of new states or organizations, a ‘dialogue partner’ mechanism is being introduced, 
thereby allowing for an earlier stage to observer status and fully fledged member. Concern that 
expansion of SCO would import rivalries has not been demonstrated in view of India and Pakistan 
being admitted as observers. Nor are great-power/small-power discrepancies necessarily a 
problem. Despite Uzbekistan’s reported opposition to “quick enlargement of SCO because its 
voice might be offset by an incoming big constituent power”,
73
 in many ways the current 
composition of SCO demonstrates an ability to live with power discrepancies. Iwashita has noted 
SCO’s “complex double structure” of Sino-Russian great power bipolarity and “an asymmetric 





Moreover, avoidance of hierarchical relations through consensus decision-making is a 
common attribute of Asia-Pacific regionalism, notably evident in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) which includes a nation as small in power as Laos as well as the more 
powerful states of Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia; ASEAN+3 (the three being China, Japan, 
and South Korea); East Asia Summit (comprising ASEAN+3, plus India, Australia and New 
Zealand), and even the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that includes not only 
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Asian countries but those from the Americas, including the US, and also multiregional Russia. 
China has deliberately favored structuring its relations with ASEAN in such a way as to retain 
ASEAN as the centerpiece, especially in the new East Asian regionalism which is an enlarged 
version of ASEAN+3. If China were to place itself in the lead, this would incite rivalry with Japan 
for East Asian leadership. Similarly in SCO, Russo-Chinese rivalry could be offset by the “balance 
of interests”
75
 approach and the integration of the region across many sectors, as shown by 
development of SCO as a security, economic and socio-cultural region.
76
 The attraction of 
powerful states or organizations to SCO may well be inevitable in view of Eurasia’s strategic 
importance. However the tiered Asian approach of a core set of states ‘plus’ other states or 




Sino-Turkish axis of diplomacy? 
 
The above discussion has a direct bearing on expanding opportunities in Sino-Turkish 
relations. What might be envisaged as a Sino-Turkic axis of diplomacy would certainly 
complement their wider security memberships. In Turkey’s case, the principal relevant 
organization is NATO. It includes some 1150 Turkish troops in its International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
78
 In China’s case it is, as noted, the SCO. While NATO 
and SCO have been characterized as potential competitors for influence in Eurasia, this article has 
argued that they are not necessarily so in view of SCO’s open charter and a common need by 
NATO and SCO to help stabilize Afghanistan – and Central Asia generally.  
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Further bridging the interests of NATO and SCO is the possibility of an East-West axis 
between China and Turkey being diplomatically activated, and an EU-Russian arc of influence. 
Moreover, with the EU dependent on Russia for a quarter of its oil and gas supplies, it is unlikely 
to promote strategic rivalry with Russia. Meanwhile, the NATO-Russia Council established in 
2002 and Partnership for Peace that includes Russia and a number of Central Asian states, may 
serve as a platform for strengthening relations. SCO member Kazakhstan set the pace by signing 
an Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO in 2006. A NATO-SCO convergence (or 
‘mechanism’) would hold implications for Turkey and, for that matter, the EU. They would find 
common cause in their foreign policies in the region, but with Turkey acting out of its capacity as 
a resident actor rather than an external power projecting influence as the EU would. The political 
and physical distance for the EU would be removed under circumstances of EU enlargement to 
include Turkey. This would help legitimize Europe as a Eurasian power.  
 
Similarly, the SCO would benefit by making Iran a full member, not to challenge NATO or its 
most powerful member, the US: the SCO is no 21
st
 century incarnation of the Warsaw Pact. Three 
purposes are served by giving Iran full membership of SCO in the future. First, Tehran’s foreign 
policy would be harnessed within a wider Eurasian strategic posture that would dilute threat 
perceptions of and by Iran. Second, it would assist Tehran in coping with the regional impact of 
Iraq’s continued civil war (with or without the American presence) and Kurdish separatist 
aspirations for the creation of an independent Kurdistan.
79
 Third, Iranian membership of SCO 
would assure China of Iranian and future Iraqi oil supplies, and in return economically benefit 
Iran. China is estimated to need another 25 years to fully industrialize. Hence its appetite for 
energy and resources will remain strong. Industrializing India finds itself in a similar situation, and 
will no doubt find it advantageous to move to full membership of SCO along with Iran.  
 
If full SCO member China and observer-country India represent the energy consuming side of 
the SCO equation, Russia as a core SCO country and Iran as an observer serve as the main energy 
providers. Russia possesses the world’s largest and Iran the second largest natural gas reserves. 
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China is now the world’s second largest consumer of oil after the United States; and Russia is the 
world’s second largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia. Converting both India and Iran to full 
membership would strengthen a common energy strategy, including pipeline projects, production 
capacity, and transport infrastructure. Bringing Pakistan in would open an ‘energy corridor’ 
between China and the Middle East. It would also relieve dysfunctional South Asian rivalries and 
strengthen SCO influence on Afghanistan. These interlocking strategic symmetries suggest 
cooperation is the SCO’s best policy – both internally and externally. 
 
 
Turkey’s role in Eurasian geopolitics 
 
How does Turkey fit into this scenario and how does it impact its relations with China? 
Turkish territory may be confined to the Western sector of Eurasia, but Turkish-speaking peoples 
still inhabit Central Asia and form part of the Chinese state – its northwestern region of Xinjiang. 
As noted above, secessionist groups there seek to form an independent country of East Turkistan. 
China would do well to include Turkey in the SCO mission of fighting separatists and thus 
denying rebel groups potential sources of support through cultural kinship claims. Ankara, for its 
part, has local Kurdish separatists to consider, and the problems posed by the PKK have not 
abated. Turkey is also strengthening relations with Russia, which has its own internal challenges 
from Chechnya, and Russia is China’s great power cooperator in Eurasia. In light of Turkey’s 
cultural history, religious identity, and geostrategic location on Eurasia’s Western flank, it 
represents an ideal SCO candidate. Ankara announced in January 2005 that it would explore 
cooperation with SCO. This occurred during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit 
to Moscow in January that year when he led a huge Turkish delegation of 52 members of 
parliament and 600 business executives, underscoring the importance of a leading SCO member - 
Russia - in Turkey’s trade and geopolitical relations.
80
 SCO, NATO and (eventually) EU 
membership would confer on Turkey a genuinely integrative role in Eurasian diplomacy. It is 
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worth emphasizing that there is no contradiction between NATO and SCO membership. This was 
well expressed by Atilla Sandikli: 
 
We would still continue our relations with the West, we would stay in NATO and we would 
correctly develop EU relations. But I believe that our presence as an observatory state in the 
SCO would be important in order to follow developments in a region where our interest and 




This would accord with China’s visions of cooperative regionalism rather than interventionist 
methods of promoting change for the better. ‘Going with the flow’ is a Taoist adage, and 
combining opposites as represented in the yin-yang symbol is a political stratagem. When China’s 
reformist leader Deng Xiaoping used the formula of one country (China), two systems (socialism 
and capitalism) to reunify socialist PRC with capitalist Hong Kong and Macao, he had shown a 
Chinese philosophical trait of finding an optimal solution through combining differences. This 
may be regarded as pragmatism but it also strengthens the resultant configuration – like legs of a 
chair that stabilize. The coordinative approach, which Deng’s revolutionary predecessor, Mao 
Zedong, applied in his time was called the ‘United Front’ strategy. It used differences for building 
power and recognized the limitation’s of one’s own power. 
 
 It was suggested earlier in this article that bilateral Sino-Turkish military relations and 
perceived insensitivity to domestic ‘threats’ might be better addressed through multilateral 
regionalism. Conversely, poor or non-existent regional relations might aggravate the bilateral one. 
The obvious obstacle to the above geopolitical opportunity in Sino-Turkish relations is the 
Xinjiang Uyghur issue. Just as Turkish SCO membership would be expected to dampen Uyghur 
separatist sentiments, the absence of Turkey from SCO arrangements – even minimally as 
dialogue partner – might allow a Turkic identity politics in Eurasia to seek moral support (or more) 
from its identifiable state metropole, Turkey. While Ankara would not wish to jeopardise relations 
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with Beijing by giving separatist elements there any support, it has been argued that the Turkish 






The underdeveloped nature of Turkey-China relations prompts an inspection of the two 
countries side by side. A profile emerges of Turkey and China sharing certain symmetries despite 
obvious differences in size and resources. They reflect one another in maintenance of a ‘strong 
state’ ethic in an ‘international community’ wary of strong states other than the United States lest 
the democracy-human rights nexus be questioned. These and other symmetries may be regarded as 
‘keys’ to opening the gates to greater cooperation and consequent mutual benefit in a range of 
sectors – from the economic to the strategic; or, alternatively, to locking each other out from the 
prospect of a ‘win-win’ future because of ossified threat perceptions. Today neither is prepared to 
support Turkic ethnic or former Maoist compatriots that could only render diplomatic relations 
dysfunctional. As Turkey and China stand at the gates of Eurasia, it is well to dwell on the Turkish 
word ‘kapi’, which not only means door or gate, but possibility. The possibility of a Sino-Turkish 
axis of diplomacy would certainly complement their wider security memberships and even bridge 
them. In view of the SCO being an economic as well as a security organization, and its nested 
layers of expansion, it is displaying mandalic properties that promote a cooperative dynamic in 
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